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Abstract 
 
This study examines how the existence of multiple 
charitable campaigns supporting similar causes on 
the same platform influence the donations received by 
each campaign. The existence of multiple campaigns 
supporting similar causes can have negative 
externalities as they compete for donors. However, the 
existence of additional campaigns can also result in 
positive externalities as potential donors benefit from 
a larger variety of projects to choose from. This study 
observes negative and positive externalities from the 
existence of multiple campaigns supporting similar 
causes. An increase in the number of campaigns leads 
to a decrease in the average donation received by each 
campaign, indicating that the additional campaigns do 
not necessarily expand the market. However, when 
some of the campaigns perform exceptionally well, 
other campaigns – including non-top performing 
campaigns – receive more donation, highlighting the 
market expansion effect of the presence of successful 
campaigns on a platform.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Crowdfunding has transformed charitable 
fundraising practices [8]. Charitable fundraisers, even 
inexperienced ones, can now start new charitable 
campaigns on crowdfunding platforms and reach a 
large set of potential donors around the world at low 
fundraising costs. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
more and more charitable fundraisers turn to 
crowdfunding platforms as a viable fundraising 
channel in the recent years. Indeed, GoFundMe, a 
charity-focused crowdfunding platform and the focus 
of this study, is the fourth-ranked crowdfunding 
platform based on site traffics as recorded by 
Alexa.com [12]. It trails only Kickstarter, Indiegogo, 
                                                 
1 Some campaigns on GoFundMe support causes that are not 
typically associated with charities, such as funding memorial funds 
for an individual, funding a personal trip, funding a wedding, etc. 
and Patreon, which are not charity-focused. 
Fundraisers on GoFundMe have raised more than US$ 
3 billion since the platform’s inception in 2010 [1].  
With the increasing popularity of charitable 
fundraising on crowdfunding platforms, many 
charitable crowdfunding campaigns are likely to share 
similar causes – that is, supporting the relief efforts 
associated with a particular natural disaster event – on 
the same platform. Indeed, the dataset utilized in this 
study includes at least 850 campaigns posted on 
GoFundMe in support of the relief efforts of victims 
of Hurricane Matthew that made its landfall in South 
Carolina, USA on October 8, 2016. Similarly, over 
2,600 campaigns were posted on GoFundMe in 
response to Hurricane Harvey that made its landfall in 
the Texas Gulf Coast on August 25, 2017. This study 
examines how the existence of multiple charitable 
campaigns supporting similar causes on the same 
crowdfunding platform influence the donations 
received by these campaigns.  
This study examines campaigns aiming to support 
relief efforts of natural disaster events. This focus has 
two benefits.  First, the analyses mitigate the 
(potentially large) variation in the worthiness of causes 
supported by various campaigns on charitable crowd-
funding platforms.1  The campaigns examined in this 
study share the same focus of natural disaster relief 
efforts, and therefore their causes are quite similar. 
Second, this focus allows for comparisons with 
findings from studies on competition in markets where 
corporations or institutions offer similar products (i.e., 
products that are close substitutes) and compete 
against each other for buyers. 
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study 
to examine how the presence of other charitable 
campaigns influences the success of campaigns on 
crowdfunding platforms. Specifically, this study 
investigate whether the presence of other campaigns 
supporting similar causes result in both positive and 
negative externalities.  
An example of such campaigns is 
https://www.gofundme.com/AmieeVacationFunds. 
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Existing studies on other markets have 
documented that the presence of additional firms have 
negative externalities (e.g., [11]). These negative 
externalities stem from business stealing among firms 
in that market. In the charitable crowdfunding context, 
faced with budget constraints, donors are unlikely to 
contribute to all campaigns with similar causes. As a 
result, these campaigns compete against each other for 
potential donors’ money.  
However, existing studies have also identified a 
potential channel of positive externalities (e.g., [2], 
[3], [7], [10], [15], and [16]).  Crowdfunding platforms 
are two-sided markets, in which agents from one side 
of the market benefit from increased interactions with 
agents from the other side of the market, creating 
positive cross-group externality ([3] and [15]) that 
potentially increases the size of the market.   
In the charitable crowdfunding context, more 
donors may be attracted to a particular platform when 
the number of campaigns that donors can choose from 
in that platform increases. The additional campaigns 
offer a larger variety of projects that potential donors 
can choose from. However, the larger variety does not 
necessarily mean that donors would have an easier 
time identifying campaigns that maximize their 
utilities. In order to increase their chances of finding 
such campaigns, donors would be looking for signals 
that a platform hosts high-quality campaigns. When 
top campaigns on a platform perform particularly well, 
potential donors are likely to use this as a quality 
signal, not only of those top campaigns, but also of the 
overall quality of campaigns hosted on that platform 
[16]. 
The empirical analyses in this study include two 
sets of control variables to mitigate potential 
endogeneity concerns.  First, to capture time-invariant 
heterogeneity across campaigns, campaign fixed 
effects are included in all analyses at the campaign 
level. Second, a vector of control variables are 
included in the empirical model. To the extent that this 
vector includes relevant factors that may affect both 
campaign outcomes and the presence of additional 
campaigns, the inclusion of these control variables 
helps to mitigate potential omitted variable concerns.  
This study observes both negative and positive 
externalities from the presence of other charitable 
campaigns supporting similar causes on the donations 
received by each campaign. This study finds that an 
increase in the number of campaigns supporting relief 
efforts for a particular natural disaster event leads to 
less donation received by those campaigns. This is 
consistent with the business stealing effects of 
additional campaigns. This observed negative 
externality suggests that market expansion does not 
occur merely because more campaigns supporting 
similar causes are available on the platform. 
However, when the top performing campaigns 
supporting relief efforts for a particular natural disaster  
event perform exceptionally well in obtaining 
donations or social media mentions (relative to other 
campaigns sharing the same event), other campaigns 
supporting relief efforts for the same event receive 
more donations. This finding is consistent with the 
quality-based market expansion hypothesis presented 
in [10] and [16]. This positive externality is 
experienced by a wide range of campaigns, including 
non-top performing campaigns. This indicates that 
market expansion occurs when the top campaigns 
perform exceptionally well relative to other campaigns 
on the platform.  
A further analysis of the market shares of top-
performing versus non-top performing campaigns 
indicates that neither the positive nor negative 
externalities has a significant effect on the distribution 
of donations among the top performing campaigns. 
However, for the non-top performing campaigns, 
while they receive more donations when the top 
performing campaigns perform exceptionally well, 
they still lose some of their market shares. 
 
2. Hypotheses development  
 
Existing studies have documented both negative 
and positive externalities from new entrants (e.g., [2], 
[3], [7], [10], [11], [15], and [16]). A study of peer-to-
peer microloans by [11] documented a negative effect 
of the presence of other campaigns, particularly 
among close substitutes, on funding speed. Their 
findings suggest that similar projects on a peer-to-peer 
microloan platform are stealing lenders from one 
another. 
Using charitable donors’ utility function posited by 
[14], we assume that donors on charitable 
crowdfunding platforms receive positive utility from 
two sources: (1) from the joy of making a donation 
(i.e., warm glow or joy-of-giving) and (2) from the 
improvement of the well-being of the beneficiaries as 
the results of the benefits delivered by the fundraisers 
(i.e., altruism). However, each donor’s ability to 
maximize her/his utility is limited by her/his budget 
constraint. Given these constraints, donors are 
unlikely to contribute to all campaigns providing them 
with positive utility. As a result, campaigns will have 
to compete with one another to get their donations. 
Therefore, we expect: 
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Hypothesis 1 (Negative Externalities):  An 
increase in the number of campaigns supporting 
similar causes on the same platform leads to less 
donation received by each of those campaigns. 
 
In the context of two-sided markets, such as 
crowdfunding platforms, agents from one side of the 
market benefit from their interactions with agents from 
the other side of the market and vice versa. This 
positive cross-group externality, as posited by [3] and 
[15], implies that as the number of agents from one 
side of the market increases, the number of agents 
from the other side is likely to increase. As such, the 
market can expand as a result of new entrants into the 
market. Assuming that the size of the donors’ market 
is endogenous, [2] posited that the entries of additional 
non-governmental organizations (NGO) can “wake” 
additional potential donors through increased 
collective fundraising efforts. Consistent with this 
hypothesis, [7] found that entry by high quality movie 
theaters attracts new patrons to the theaters.  
[10] and [16] posit that the quality of the agents 
from one side of the market also matters in attracting 
more agents from the other side of the market to the 
platform. When potential buyers observe the presence 
of some high quality sellers on a particular platform, 
they revise their beliefs regarding the quality of all 
sellers on that particular platform upwards. [16] argues 
that low quality sellers will not enter a platform 
dominated by high quality sellers because of the 
potential cost faced by low quality sellers if their true 
quality is later revealed to the buyers. As such, 
potential buyers prefer to transact in a platform 
dominated by high quality sellers as it increases their 
likelihood of finding campaigns that maximize their 
utilities [10]. 
In this context, the presence of more campaigns 
may expand the potential donors market, which leads 
to higher donations received by each campaign on the 
platform. Consistent with [10] and [16], such market 
expansion is likely to occur in the presence of high 
quality campaigns. In most cases, the quality of a 
campaign is not fully revealed to potential donors. In 
these cases, donors may look at campaigns’ 
performance in raising funds as a signal of quality [4]. 
When campaigns on a platform – particularly top 
campaigns, which are the most visible to potential 
donors – are doing exceptionally well in raising funds 
they send a signal of a good quality. This signal spills 
over to the platform and by extension to other 
campaigns on the platform, which then attracts more 
potential donors. 
As such, we can expect that when the top 
campaigns on a platform are performing exceptionally 
well donors market on the platform is expanded. In this 
study, the performance of the top campaigns is 
measured using the portion of the donations received 
by the top 25% of highest earning campaigns over the 
donations received by all campaigns supporting the 
relief efforts to help victims of a particular natural 
disaster event of top earning campaigns on a particular 
platform.   
 
Hypothesis 2 (Positive Externalities): When the 
top earning campaigns supporting relief efforts of 
a particular event receive more donations relative 
to the rest of the campaigns associated with the 
same event, campaigns associated with that same 
event receive more donations. 
 
3. Data description  
 
This study utilizes a panel dataset containing 
charitable campaigns on GoFundMe that help victims 
of natural disaster events. Python codes were utilized 
to collect publicly available data daily from 
GoFundMe’s website, www.gofundme.com, in 2016 
and 2017. The panel dataset contains daily data for at 
least 50 days after the occurrence of each event of 
7,899 unique charitable campaigns helping victims of 
five major natural disaster events: Hurricane Matthew 
(September 2016), Hurricane Harvey (August 2017), 
Hurricane Irma (September 2017), Hurricane Maria 
(September 2017), and Mexico City earthquake 
(September 2017). 
When queried for a specific natural disaster event, 
GoFundMe displays at most 500 campaigns related to 
that event. These displayed campaigns seem to be the 
most active (i.e., still receiving donations) among 
campaigns supporting relief efforts for the 
corresponding natural disaster event. For our analyses, 
we focus on campaigns that appear on the list 
displayed by GoFundMe on the previous day t-1.  This 
approach allows us to measure the donations received 
on day t as the difference between the total donation 
amount in day t and the total donation amount in day 
t-1.  Therefore, the analysis in this study employs at 
most 500 campaigns during each day following a 
particular natural disaster.   
However, we use all campaigns supporting similar 
causes that have appeared on GoFundMe’s list thus far 
to calculate the independent variables of interest: 
number of campaigns and the ratios of high- vs. low-
performing campaigns.  We do this as donors can still 
access each active campaign, including those not 
appearing on GoFundMe’s list, using a direct link to 
the campaign’s page. Moreover, donors who have 
donated to unlisted campaigns can continue to be 
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advocates for those campaigns as well as the 
GoFundMe platform.   
The charitable crowdfunding campaigns in the 
dataset raised a total of US$ 35.9 million from 327,004 
donors by the end of the data collection periods (see 
Table 1). The dataset includes at least 50 days after the 
occurrence of each event. The data on Hurricane 
Matthew, Hurricane Maria, and Mexico City 
earthquake cover 50 days since the occurrence of each 
event. The data on Hurricane Harvey cover 57 days 
after the hurricane made its landfall in Texas. The data 
on Hurricane Irma cover 59 days since its landfall in 
Florida. Campaigns on GoFundMe can stay open for a 
long time even after their funding goals are reached. 
However, the 50-days observation window seems 
sufficient to capture the campaigns’ life cycle. As 
shown on Figure 1, over 87% of the total amounts of 
donations were received within the first 30 days of the 
occurrence of the events in our dataset. These 
campaigns do not receive much donations anymore 
beyond 30 days after the occurrence of the events they 
are associated with.  Therefore, the 50-day window 
includes the active period (i.e., first 30 days after the 
occurrence of each event) as well as the non-active 
period (i.e., beyond day 30) of fundraising for victims 
of natural disaster events. 
Similarly, Figure 2 shows that most campaigns 
entered the market within the first 10 days of the 
occurrence of the events they are associated with. Over 
97% of campaigns in our dataset entered the market 
within the first 30 days of the occurrence of the events 
in the dataset. This implies that within the same event, 
most campaigns are of similar age. The relatively short 
active period of fundraising is consistent with the 
urgent nature of natural disaster relief efforts and the 
short attention span given to such events. 
 
Table 1. Campaign Statistics, by event 
 
Event Date Number of Campaigns 
Total 
Donations 
Total 
Donors 
Hurricane 
Matthew 10/16 850 $3,007,368 31,214 
Hurricane 
Harvey 08/17 2,627 $19,220,782 169,954 
Hurricane 
Irma 09/17 2,516 $7,110,700 61,925 
Hurricane 
Maria 09/17 1,906 $6,624,402 63,911 
Mexico City 
earthquake 09/17 133 $274,669 2,905 
Total 7,899 $35,963,252 327,004 
 
Additionally, the Google Trends index for each of 
the natural disaster events in the dataset is used to 
capture the differences in the popularity of those 
events. Google Trends index is calculated using query 
share, which is the search volume for a particular 
query term divided by the total search volume on 
Google at a given point in time [5]. The Google Trends 
index of a particular natural disaster event can be 
utilized as a proxy for how popular that event is 
because the index represents the relative volume of 
search for that particular event. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Total donations received,  
by event and time 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Number of campaigns,  
by event and time 
 
4. Empirical model  
 
The presence of other charitable campaigns 
supporting similar causes can have both negative and 
positive externalities for all campaigns with similar 
causes. The empirical model in Equation 1 is used to 
test for the existence of negative and positive 
externalities as specified in Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
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𝑙𝑛൫𝐷𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑅𝑐𝑣௧,௜൯ = 𝛼ଵ ∗ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝐶𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑠௧ 
     +𝛼ଶ ∗ 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜௧ିଵ + Β ∗ 𝑋 + Θ ∗ 𝑍 + 𝜀            (1) 
 
The dependent variable in the empirical model in 
Equation 1 (DonationRcvt,i) is the amount of donations 
(in US Dollars) received by campaign i at time t. The 
first independent variable of interest is the number of 
campaigns supporting the relief efforts of the same 
natural disaster as campaign i (NumCampaignst) at 
time t. The second independent variable of interest is 
EarnRatiot-1, the ratio of the total donations received 
by the top 25% highest earning campaigns supporting 
the relief efforts of a specific natural disaster event on 
a particular day over the total donations received by all 
campaigns focusing on that event on the same day. 
While the top 25% campaigns are identified daily, the 
grouping seems to be quite stable across consecutive 
days. 
Two sets of control variables are included to 
mitigate potential endogeneity concerns.  First, to 
capture time-invariant heterogeneity across 
campaigns, campaign fixed effects (Z) are included in 
the model. As the success of each campaign can 
depend on its own characteristics as well as the 
characteristics of the disaster event it is associated 
with, it is crucial to include campaign fixed effects.  
Second, a vector of control variables are included 
in the empirical model (X) to mitigate potential 
omitted variable concerns. These control variables 
include (1) the Google Trends index of the natural 
disaster event associated with campaign i (GTrends) at 
time t-1, (2) donations received in the previous time 
period (DonationRcv at t-1), and (3) a binary indicator 
for the first five days since the occurrence of another 
natural disaster event (NewEvent).  
The Google Trends index of the natural disaster 
event associated with campaign i (GTrends) is 
included to capture the popularity of the event which 
may affect the number of potential donors willing to 
help and the amount of money these donors willing to 
give to help victims of that particular natural disaster 
event. It is important to capture the relative popularity 
of the event in the model to avoid potential 
endogeneity issue caused by omitted variable biased. 
More specifically, it is possible that the number of 
campaigns supporting similar causes and the relative 
performance of the top campaigns are both driven by 
the popularity of the particular event associated with 
these campaigns. The Google Trend index of a natural 
disaster event is suitable to capture the relative 
attention received by the event, potentially reflecting 
the volume of news coverage on that event. Hence, the 
inclusion of the Google Trend index in the model also 
alleviate the concern regarding the potential effects of 
news coverage on the number of campaigns 
supporting the relief efforts for a particular event and 
the performance of those campaigns. 
The donations received in the previous day is 
included in the model to control for campaign i’s own 
momentum from the previous day. The NewEvent 
binary indicator variable is included in the model to 
examine the effect of a new natural disaster event 
during the 50-days fundraising period captured in the 
dataset. In particular, the NewEvent variable captures 
the potential effect of the arrival of a new disaster 
event that attract public interests and can detract 
potential donors’ attention from the focal event. Table 
2 displays the summary statistics of the variables 
included in the model. 
The empirical model in Equation 1 is estimated 
using a panel regression method with campaign fixed 
effects. Event and time period clustering is also used 
in the regression to control for within-time-period and 
within-event correlation. 
 
Table 2. Variables Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
DonationRcvt $169 $1,793 
EarnRatiot-1 0.88 0.10 
NumCampaignst 1890 750 
Gtrendst-1 6.79 17.89 
 
5. Main results  
 
First, the model in Equation 1 is estimated at an 
aggregate level. More specifically, we aggregated our 
dataset based on five natural disaster events across at 
least 50 time periods for each event. Table 3 shows the 
regression estimates using the aggregated dataset.  
The positive estimate for EarnRatio indicates that 
the relative success of the top 25% of campaigns based 
on donations received has positive externalities on the 
total donations received by all campaigns supporting 
relief efforts for a particular natural disaster event in 
the next day. This result suggests that the success of 
the top campaigns supporting relief efforts of a 
particular event is likely to bring in more potential 
donors to that cause on a platform. Donors who 
contributed to those top campaigns can reach out to 
other potential donors and become advocates (i.e., 
providing additional publicity) for the cause and the 
platform. 
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Table 3. The effects of other campaigns, 
aggregated by event 
 
  Log(DonationsRcv) 
EarnRatio (t-1) 17.309*** 
 (5.0971) 
NumCampaigns (t) 0.002 
 (0.0020) 
Observations 240 
R-squared 0.532 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses. Coefficients for event fixed effects are 
suppressed. Control variables are included in the regression, 
but their estimates are suppressed.  
 
Table 4 shows the regression estimates using the 
non-aggregated dataset (i.e., across campaigns and 
time periods). The results show that on average each 
campaign is both positively and negatively affected by 
the existence of other campaigns supporting relief 
efforts for the same natural disaster event. 
Specifically, the results in Table 4 indicate that an 
increase in the number of campaigns supporting relief 
efforts for a particular natural disaster event 
(NumCampaigns) leads to less donations received by 
each campaign with similar causes (DonationRcv) on 
average, consistent with Hypothesis 1. 
The positive estimate for EarnRatio in Table 4 
indicates that the relative success of the top earning 
campaigns on a particular day has positive 
externalities on other campaigns supporting relief 
efforts for the same event on the subsequent day. This 
result is consistent with Hypothesis 2. These results 
suggest that market expansion occurs only when some 
campaigns raising funds for relief efforts of a 
particular disaster event perform exceptionally well 
compared to other campaigns associated with the same 
event, consistent with [10] and [16]. A mere increase 
in the number of campaigns do not appear to expand 
the donors market. Instead, it has a negative effect on 
the amount of donations received by these campaigns.  
 
Table 4. The effects of other campaigns 
 
  Log(DonationsRcv) 
EarnRatio (t-1) 22.193*** 
 (2.8603) 
NumCampaigns (t) -0.012*** 
 (0.0011) 
Observations 86,678 
R-squared 0.522 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. Coefficients for campaign fixed 
effects are suppressed. Control variables are included 
in the regression, but their estimates are suppressed.  
Figure 3 shows that the positive effect of the 
relative success of the top earning campaigns is 
decreasing over time. However, this positive effect 
stays persistent for more than a week indicating that 
all campaigns supporting relief efforts for a particular 
natural disaster event continue to benefit from the 
relative success of the top earning campaigns.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Coefficient estimates for EarnRatio  
for different time lag 
 
Now the question is whether the existence of other 
campaigns with similar causes affect top performing 
campaigns versus low performing campaigns 
differently. Column 1 of Table 5 shows the estimates 
for the top 25% highest earning campaigns and 
column 2 of Table 5 shows the estimates for the 
bottom 75% lowest earning campaigns. 
The results in Table 5 shows that negative and 
positive externalities are experienced by top earning 
campaigns as well as low earning campaigns. 
However, the negative externalities from an increased 
in the number of campaigns supporting relief efforts 
for the same event seems to be stronger for the top 
earning campaigns.  
As expected, the relative success of top earning 
campaigns has positive externalities on those 
campaigns themselves on the subsequent day (column 
1 of Table 5). However, more interestingly, positive 
externalities for other campaigns – i.e., campaigns 
with relatively weak performance so far – are 
observed. Specifically, the low performing campaigns 
also benefit from the relative success of top earning 
campaigns (column 2 of Table 5). 
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Table 5. The effects of other campaigns, 
for top versus bottom earning campaigns 
 
  Top 25% earners 
Bottom 75% 
earners 
  Log(DonationsRcv) 
EarnRatio (t-1) 37.916*** 11.942*** 
 (5.4313) (3.5875) 
NumCampaigns (t) -0.013*** -0.009*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0011) 
Observations 45,010 41,668 
R-squared 0.539 0.423 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses. Coefficients for campaign fixed effects are 
suppressed. Control variables are included in the regression, but 
their estimates are suppressed. 
 
The regressions also include various control 
variables, whose parameter estimates are suppressed 
in Tables 3, 4, and 5. The arrivals of new disaster 
events do not significantly affect the donations 
received by top performing campaigns. However, 
these arrivals negatively affect the donations received 
by the non-top performing campaigns. This suggests 
that when a new natural disaster occurs, potential 
donors become less likely to support campaigns 
related to existing events that have not been 
performing well.  
 
6. Additional results  
 
One may also ask whether the existence of other 
campaigns affects the distribution of donations across 
campaigns supporting relief efforts for the same 
natural disaster event. More specifically, one may ask 
how the existence of other campaigns supporting 
similar causes affects the market share (will be called 
donation share, henceforth) of each campaign. 
Table 6 shows the regression estimates for the 
empirical model in Equation 1 with a different 
dependent variable. In the modified specification, the 
share of donations (DonationShare) that a campaign 
has received thus far is used as the dependent variable. 
DonationShare is defined following the market share 
definition in [6], which is the portion of the total 
donations received by campaigns supporting a 
particular set of causes that is received by a particular 
campaign supporting one of those causes. By using 
donation share as a dependent variable in the model, 
we can examine whether the presence of other 
campaigns change how total donations for a particular 
event are distributed across campaigns supporting 
relief efforts for that event within the same platform. 
 
 
Table 6. The effects of other campaigns 
on donation shares 
 
  
Top 25% 
earners 
Bottom 75% 
earners 
  DonationShare 
EarnRatio (t-1) 0.012 -0.004** 
 (0.0105) (0.0018) 
NumCampaigns (t) -0.000** -0.000** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Observations 44,672 40,455 
R-squared 0.268 0.136 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses. Coefficients for campaign fixed effects are 
suppressed. Control variables are included in the regression, but 
their estimates are suppressed.  
 
The results in column 1 of Table 6 suggest that the 
presence of other campaigns supporting similar cause 
does not significantly alter the distribution of 
donations across top earning campaigns supporting 
relief efforts for a particular event. Furthermore, the 
distribution of donations across these top performing 
campaigns is also not affected by the relative success 
of these top performing campaigns. 
In contrast, the results in column 2 of Table 6 
indicate that the market shares of the low performing 
campaigns are negatively affected by the relative 
success of the top earning campaigns. It appears that 
while the low performing campaigns benefit from the 
relative performance of the top earning campaigns (see 
column 2 of Table 5), these low performing campaigns 
lose some of their market shares to the top performing 
campaigns. 
 
7. Robustness tests  
 
7.1. Alternate measure of campaigns’ 
performance 
 
Table 7 shows the regression estimates for another 
alternative specification of the empirical model in 
Equation 1. Social networks have been documented by 
existing studies to influence the success of non-
charitable crowdfunding projects (e.g., [9], [13]). 
Donors who have contributed to campaigns on a 
particular platform can reach out to their social 
networks through various means of communication, 
including social media, advocating the platform as a 
viable channel for supporting charitable causes. This 
advocacy can increase the public awareness of the 
platform as a channel for charitable contributions.  
In this modified model, MentionRatio is used to 
capture the relative popularity of the top endorsed 
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campaigns in Facebook mentions and Twitter tweets 
on a particular day. MentionRatio is defined as the 
ratio of the total number of social media mentions 
received by the top endorsed campaigns supporting 
similar causes on a particular day over the total amount 
of social media mentions received by all campaigns 
supporting these causes on that day.2 The Facebook 
mentions and Twitter tweets received by the top 
endorsed campaigns can help advocate for the causes 
supported by those campaigns and the platform as a 
viable channel for supporting those causes. 
The negative and positive externalities observed 
previously remains robust in this modified model. 
Similar to the results in Table 4, the positive estimate 
for MentionRatio indicates that the relative success of 
the top endorsed campaigns in getting mentioned on 
social media has positive externalities on all 
campaigns supporting relief efforts for the same 
natural disaster event.  
 
Table 7. The effects of other campaigns, 
using an alternate measure of campaigns’ 
performance 
 
  Log(DonationsRcv) 
MentionRatio (t-1) 20.571*** 
 (2.6242) 
NumCampaigns (t) -0.011*** 
 (0.0010) 
Observations 86,678 
R-squared 0.523 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients for 
campaign fixed effects are suppressed. Control 
variables are included in the regression, but their 
estimates are suppressed.  
 
7.2. Alternate specification on top and bottom 
performing campaigns 
 
The robustness of this study’s main results in Table 
4 is also checked by changing the specification for top 
earning campaigns. In this alternate specification, top 
earning campaigns are defined as the top 40% of 
campaigns with the highest donations received thus 
far. As such, EarnRatio40 is the ratio of the total 
donations received by the top 40% highest earning 
campaigns supporting the relief efforts of a specific 
natural disaster event on a particular day over the total 
donations received by all campaigns focusing on that 
event on the same day. Additionally, I use a subset of 
the original dataset containing only the top 40% 
                                                 
2 Top endorsed campaigns are defined as campaigns that receive 
daily social media mentions that are in the top 25% of all 
highest earning campaigns and the lowest 40% earning 
campaigns of the day in this regression. The middle 
20% of campaigns are not included in this regression 
to exclude the effects on the 20% campaigns in the 
middle from the results.  
The results in Table 8 shows that the direction and 
statistical significance of our variable of interests 
remain robust with this alternate specification of top 
earning campaign using the subset of dataset 
containing only the top and bottom 40% of campaigns 
based on the total donations they have received. 
 
Table 8. The effects of other campaigns 
using an alternate specification of top 
earning campaigns and subset dataset 
 
  Log(DonationsRcv) 
EarnRatio40 (t-1) 49.219*** 
 (5.7025) 
NumCampaigns (t) -0.015*** 
 (0.0012) 
Observations 71,235 
R-squared 0.524 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients for 
campaign fixed effects are suppressed. Control 
variables are included in the regression, but their 
estimates are suppressed.  
 
8. Discussion and future directions  
 
This study finds both negative and positive 
externalities from the existence of other charitable 
campaigns supporting relief efforts for the same 
natural disaster event on the same platform. An 
increase in the number of campaigns supporting relief 
efforts for a particular event on the same 
crowdfunding platform leads to less donations 
received by those campaigns on the following day. 
This finding is consistent with the business stealing 
effects of additional campaigns.  
However, when the top performing campaigns (in 
terms of donations or social media mentions) are 
performing exceptionally well, other campaigns 
supporting relief efforts for the same event on the same 
platform receive more donations on the following day. 
This study finds that the top performing campaigns are 
not the only ones benefiting from their good 
performance on the previous day. The low performing 
campaigns also benefit from abnormally good 
performance of the top campaigns. Our findings 
campaigns supporting a set of similar causes (i.e., relief efforts in 
response to a specific natural disaster event). 
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suggest that this positive externality of the abnormally 
good performing of the top campaigns appear to be 
fairly persistence over time. 
This study also finds that the presence of other 
campaigns does not change how the donations are 
distributed across the top performing campaigns. 
However, the presence of other campaigns seems to 
reduce the donation share of the low performing 
campaigns. In other words, the low performing 
campaigns seem to lose the proportion of the total 
donations received by all campaigns supporting relief 
efforts for a particular natural disaster event even 
though these low performing campaigns receive more 
donations as a result of abnormally good performance 
of the top campaigns. 
This study contributes to the literature on 
crowdfunding by documenting that the existence of 
multiple campaigns supporting similar causes on the 
same platform can generate externalities for other 
campaigns on that platform. An increase in the number 
of campaigns generates negative externality in the 
form of lower average donations. This negative effect 
suggests that a mere increase in the number of 
campaigns does not expand the donors’ market.  
The expansion of the donors market, in the form of 
more donations, appear to occur when the top 
campaigns supporting a particular cause perform 
exceptionally well. The positive effect of the 
exceptionally good performance of the top campaigns 
appears to benefit all campaigns, including the low 
performing ones. 
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